colonial-imperialist agitation was suppressed and monuments were dismantled. In West Germany, "only those colonial signs were removed that stemmed from the Nazi period," 4 and a few new monuments glorifying German colonialism were actually installed. Public historical discussion focused on Nazism, Communism, and the Holocaust; for most people the colonial past receded into a dimly remembered past. The anticolonial conflicts that played such a powerful role in France during the 1950s and 1960s were experienced by most Germans only at a distant remove.
Yet during the entire modern era, Germany -or, at least, parts of what eventually became Germany -participated in Europe's economic and ideological relation to the dominated periphery. Raw materials and precious metals from the global South flooded into the German-speaking lands. Produce stores were known as Colonialwarengeschäfte, or colonial wares shops, even until recently. Some northern Germans participated in the Atlantic slave trade. 5 Racist images and tropes generated in colonial contact zones circulated in Germany and throughout Europe (see figures 2 -3). Accounts of imperial voyages of exploration were translated quickly into German during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. German race scientists and later eugenicists and anthropologists participated in international scientific networks. These pan-European colonial ideologies took on specific accents in different linguistic and national contexts, of course. But the brevity of Germany's direct participation in overseas colonialism did not mean that Germany was any less steeped in colonial mentalities than were Britain or France. Indeed, the manner in which Germany was inserted into European domination of Africa, Asia, and the Americas has actually impeded criticism of colonial ways of thinking and acting. 6 The caesura between the end of the German colonial era and the onset of European anticolonialism is partly responsible for 4 6. How else can we explain that German neo-Nazis' preferred epithet for dark-skinned foreigners is Kanak, a term originally designating an indigenous people from French New Caledonia? The term Kanak (or Kanack) was subsequently embraced by German hip-hop musicians and TurkishGerman writers; see Feridun Zaimoglu, Kanak Sprak: 24 Misstöne vom Rande der Gesellschaft (Hamburg: Rotbuch Verlag, 1995). The best study on the circulation of images of Africans in early modern Germany is Peter Martin's Schwarze Teufel, edle Mohren (Hamburg: Junius, 1993). Café in Naumburg, built in 1596. Photo: George Steinmetz the fact that colonial-racist images and tropes remain so widespread and commonsensical in Germany. Germany did not have a resident population from its former colonies that could serve as the local bearer of anticolonialism or postcolonial criticism. In contrast to Jean-Paul Sartre and Pierre Bourdieu in France or W. E. B. DuBois in the United States, postwar German intellectuals were not drawn into the criticism of colonialism. 7 Public television shows and coffee-table books promoting an exoticized colonial nostalgia appeared continuously in West Germany after 1945. Studies of schoolbooks used in West Germany through the 1980s found that they devoted very little space to the non-European world and treated colonial history mainly from the standpoint of European explorers and conquerors. Informal socialization seemed to generate similar forms of historical consciousness: interviews conducted in West Germany between 1979 and 1981 found that most interviewees emphasized the "progress" brought to "the developing countries" by colonialism. 8 West German universities devoted comparatively meager resources to the study of non-European history. 9 Political elites had an interest in defining German colonial history as irrelevant, in part so that they could try 9. There were at least as many serious books on German colonialism written in the GDR as in There were at least as many serious books on German colonialism written in the GDR as in West Germany before 1989; for one example, see Ulrich van der Heyden, "Die historische AfrikaForschung in der DDR: Versuch einer Bilanz der Afrika-Geschichtsschreibung" ("Historical "Historical Research on Africa in the GDR: An Attempt to Draw up the Balance Sheet of Historical Writing on Africa"), in Die DDR und Afrika (The GDR and Africa), ed. Ulrich van der Heyden, Ilona Schleicher, and Hans-Georg Schleicher (Münster: Lit, 1993 -94), 108 -30. The most influential study of
The most influential study of German colonialism in Namibia is by the late East German historian Horst Drechsler: "Let Us Die to "redefine Germany's role as a 'global player' " in countries that suffered from more recent incursions by other colonial powers. 10 This is not to say that during the 1950s and 1960s West Germans were completely oblivious to the global upsurge in anticolonial activity. Colonial monuments were defaced and toppled. (But such acts sometimes seemed to be directed at least as much against U.S. imperialism as against specifically German colonial legacies: a leaflet distributed at the toppling of a statue in Hamburg in 1967 argued that "the labor of 'pacification' " in Germany's lost colonies "was carried out with the same thoroughness as in the Indian wars in North America or like today in Vietnam." See fig. 6 .) 11 Third World solidarity movements sprung up, some of them focused on the former German colonies. A handful of critical novels and historical studies were published. 12 Fighting": The Struggle of the Herero and Nama against German Imperialism (1884 -1915) 
Photo: George Steinmetz
Has postunification Germany changed? On the one hand, it has seen the rise of an extreme right-wing racist movement. 13 On the other hand, researchers have found that historical consciousness is now dominated by "anticolonialism, even dependency theory," especially among older, leftist, and better-educated interviewees. 14 A less parochial historiography, one less focused on Europe and Germany, began to gain approval among leading historians during the 1990s. 15 Offensive colonial monuments and images were no longer simply eliminated but began to be presented historically or ironically. 16 Today, colonialracist language is becoming less acceptable in everyday life. The word Schwar zer (black) is replacing Neger (Negro). Companies that produce the chocolatecovered sweets traditionally called "Negro kisses" or "Moor heads" (Negerküsse or Mohrenköpfe) have given them less offensive names like "chocolate kisses," although images like those in figures 4 -6 still appear regularly. 17 The Sarotti company, which between 1918 and 2004 used the figure of an African servant to advertise its chocolates (see fig. 9 ; the Sarotti moor is currently recognized by "98 percent of all Germans"), has eliminated the figure's large red lips and bulging eyes and lightened its skin color from black to a golden hue. A Web site for collectors of Sarotti memorabilia recommends as "obligatory reading" a critical and historical book on the Sarotti company's "Moor" imagery. 18 in 1932, was renamed "Anticolonial Monument" in 1990 and received a new plaque. In 1996 a second plaque dedicated "to the victims of German colonial rule in Namibia" was inaugurated at the monument in the presence of Namibian president Sam Nu�oma. In 2004 a Hamburg artist known as Jokinen reinstalled the statue of Hermann Wißmann that had been overturned in 1968, arguing that the sculpture could now serve as "its own countermonument" -something the students in the 1960s obviously did not think possible. Joachim Zeller, "(Post-)Koloniale Monumente: Denkmaliniativen erinnern an die imperiale Übersee-Expansion Deutschlands," www. tions in the German prisoner-of-war camps in Southwest Africa, German Togo, and Cameroon. Efforts to name and memorialize these events as genocide have met with resistance. In 2001, Ovaherero Paramount Chief Kuaima Riruako and the Herero People's Reparations Corporation launched lawsuits against the German government and against firms that profited from the forced labor of prisoners taken in the 1904 war. Government officials fear a flood of new claims if third-or fourthgeneration descendents of survivors are successful in claiming reparations. Some other Germans want to "prevent the inflationary use of the term genocide" and to "reserve the term for the extermination practices of the Nazis." 21 In Namibia itself, which has been free of colonial and apartheid rule since 1990, there is resistance to removing or even contextualizing the numerous monuments from the German colonial period (1884 -1915) that celebrate the perpetrators of various atrocities.
Nonetheless, in August 2004 the German government issued a formal apology for the events of 1904, and in May 2005 it offered a special aid package to the groups most affected by the extermination campaign (Ovaherero, Nama, and Damara peoples). In addition to this high-profile acknowledgment of colonial atrocities, public discussions have begun to connect German colonialism in Southwest Africa with Nazism, resituating Hannah Arendt's thesis of the colonial origins of totalitarianism (which emphasized South Africa) to this specific geohistorical setting. Regardless of this claim's plausibility or lack thereof, it forges an ideological connection that may permit established German practices of "coming to terms with the past" that emerged in the context of Nazism to be applied to colonialism in Namibia and in general. This could trigger in turn the sorts of anticolonial and postcolonial thinking in Germany that have played a more powerful role elsewhere. Germany might even be moving into a unique territory of official admissions of colonial guilt and responsibility. 22 The international focus on the century-old extermination campaign is also 21. Zeller, Kolonialdenkmäler, 219, summarizing arguments made by Horst Gründer at a 1985 podium discussion of the plan to add an inscription to the colonial monument in Münster.
22. The recent response to criticism of the exhibition of African culture and people at the Augsburg zoo suggests that Germany may be catching up or even moving ahead of other countries. A social anthropological group at the Max Planck institute responded immediately and generated a forty-eight-page study of the exhibit, its colonial-era precursors, and responses by visitors to the zoo. That study also notes that zoos in other countries, including the Seattle and Cleveland zoos in the U.S., have permanent exhibitions of "primitive" human cultures. See Nina Glick Schiller, Data Dea, and Markus Höhne, "African Culture and the Zoo in the Twenty-First Century: Report on the 'African Village' in Augsburg," report to the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale Germany, July 4, 2005, www.eth.mpg.de/events. having a series of effects inside Namibia. It is changing the way the Ovaherero are treated by the governing political party, SWAPO (the South West African People's Organisation), which led the struggle against South African apartheid rule. The 1904 genocide is absolutely constitutive for Ovaherero collective identity, but they make up less than 7 percent of the Namibian population. By contrast, the Ovambo, another Namibian ethnic group, constitute more than half the Namibian population and dominate SWAPO numerically, although SWAPO has long had Ovaherero and Nama members and leaders as well. Warriors led by Ovambo chief Nehale I�a Mpingana of Ondonga fought and died alongside Ovaherero fighting Germans in the colony's central region after the battle of Ohamakari, but in general the Ovambo were not directly targeted by the Germans during the 1904 -8 war. To some observers, SWAPO has seemed reluctant to focus too much attention on those events. 23 Most members of the German-speaking minority in Namibia have resisted making any changes to the many monuments from the German period. In their elaborate efforts to cultivate a specifically colonial and German view of the postcolony's history, German Namibians have reinforced a euphemistic language with respect to the events of 1904 -8, and some deny the genocide altogether. 24 Because of the Germans' economic importance in Namibia and their connections to one of its most important trading partners and foreign aid donors, the postapartheid Namibian government has not directly attacked the German-era monuments. Indeed, the Namibian Monuments Council has held that no monuments should be altered or removed, thus continuing to accord special treatment to the German ethnic group (the council has, however, started to create new monuments and sites that construct the Namibian landscape from a more indigenous and anticolonial perspective). 25 The attention that recent events have drawn to the 1904 genocide may be unsettling this implicit compromise, however, making Ovaherero grievances more central to the national self-understanding and threatening the German Namibians' protected status with respect to their monuments as well as their ownership of the some of the country's best farmland.
To understand the historical memories that connect and divide Germany and Namibia and the place of these memories in the two countries' visual archives, we need to revisit the relevant colonial history and reconstitute its visual contributions to the contemporary period. German colonization began in 1883, when the first treaties were signed by indigenous Namibians granting use of their land to representatives of a Bremen trading company. By the mid-1890s, the Germans had created a small colonial army made up mainly of Europeans, and had crushed the first movement of primary anticolonial resistance (1893 -94) led by Hendrik Witbooi. Land and cattle were transferred from the Ovaherero to the colonizers through various legal maneuvers as well as direct sales by native leaders. Indebtedness, loss of land and livestock, settler and state violence, and the construction of railways through the pastoralists' traditional territories created a sense of crisis among the Ovaherero. Panic and hatred among the colonizers led German troops to open fire on the Ovaherero at Okahand�a on January 12, 1904, an event that marks the effective beginning of the war. 26 The Ovaherero response was immediate and well coordinated: Ovaherero killed over one hundred German men (and four women), many of them settlers, many unarmed or defenseless. The German military response gathered steam slowly, and in May, General Lothar von Trotha was appointed to replace the apparently vacillating colonial governor as the commander of the German forces. On August 11, German troops armed with machine guns and cannons defeated the bulk of the Ovaherero nation -as many as forty thousand men, women, and children -who had gathered at water holes at the base of the Waterberg mountains (about 140 miles north of Windhoek; see fig. 10 ). The Ovaherero fled into the Omaheke, to the east of the Waterberg. Von Trotha's aim, in his own words, was to "finish off the rebellious tribes with rivers of blood and rivers of money." 27 On October 2, 1904, von Trotha issued his infamous statement to the Ovaherero: "All Herero, armed or unarmed . . . will be shot dead within the German borders. I will no longer accept women and children, but will force them back to their people or shoot at them." 28 Graf von Schlieffen, head of the Great General Staff of the German Army to whom control of the Southwest African war had been transferred from the colonial government early in 1904, and von Trotha's superior, did not countermand this decision but instead wrote in a letter to German chancellor von Bülow that "it is hard to disagree" with von Trotha's assessment that "the entire [Ovaherero] nation should be annihilated or driven from the country," since they had "forfeited their lives." 29 Von Trotha first ordered his troops to pursue them into the desert, and when pursuit became impossible, he stationed patrols around water holes to prevent their survival and along the edge of the desert to limit their escape. Only on December 9, after tens of thousands of Ovaherero had perished in the desert, did von Schlieffen lift the shoot-to-kill order. 30 But even then the surviving Ovaherero who were not able to escape to British Bechuanaland (Botswana) or stay hidden were condemned to undergo, in the words of the colony's acting governor, a "period of suffering" (Leidenszeit) in the concentration camps. This was intended to ease the labor shortage caused by the extermination of most of the colony's workforce and to guarantee that Namibians would "not revolt again for generations." 31 All Ovaherero land and cattle were expropriated, and European settlers acquired most of it. 32 Even today, more than 40 percent of the land in Namibia consists of commercial farms owned mainly by whites, many of them descendents of German colonizers. 33 The post of Herero Captain, or chief, was banned. The Germans tried to uproot and fragment Ovaherero communities. A large proportion of the rebellious Witbooi and other Nama groups were killed in battle or died in prison camps through willful neglect, in a process that can also be considered genocidal. 34 Figure 11 was published in the reports of the Rhenish Missionary Society, which founded the first mission to the Ovaherero in 1844; it was based on a pic-33. The German-speaking population in Namibia, estimated at 18,000 -20,000 in number, consists primarily of descendents of the pre-1918 German colonizers, although more than 3,000 new Germans emigrated to Namibia between 1951 and 1962. Rüdiger, Die NamibiaDeutschen, 155n5. On the distribution of farms owned by ethnic Germans, see Guido G. Weigand, "German Settlement Patterns in Namibia," Geographical Review 75 (1985): 156 -69. The rest of the country is made up of crowded "communal lands," as they are officially called -the sites of native reserves in the South African period. These constitute about 43 percent of Namibia and are inhabited by more than a million Africans. Sidney L. Harring and Sam Amoo, "Namibian Land: Law, Land Reform, and the Restructuring of Post-Apartheid Namibia" (paper presented at the conference, "Decontaminating the Namibian Past," National University of Namibia, August 17 -24, 2004), 3.
34. Although von Trotha's proclamation to the "rebellious Nama" in 1905 did not announce an intention to kill, there is copious official correspondence in which the Witboois and other Nama prisoners are knowingly condemned to deadly conditions of imprisonment, in both Southwest Africa and Cameroon. Figure 14 shows Samuel Maherero wearing a uniform consisting of diverse pieces of German uniforms. Similar sartorial bricolage was carried on by the "troop players" (otu rupa) movement after the war (see below). Maherero is striking a pose here that his contemporaries would have associated with Kaiser Wilhelm II (the emperor with the lame arm). 37 African chiefs were given photographs of the emperor and his wife by the colonial government and were expected to display them prominently, and Kaiser Wilhelm's birthday was a ma�or public celebration in all of the German colonies.
Some writers claim that the Germans used mainly German troops in their overseas colonies, setting them apart from the British and the French. But even in Southwest Africa, where the ma�ority of the colonial soldiers were German, the army relied on indigenous troops (see fig. 15 ). The unit that fought the Witbooi rebels in 1893 -94 included soldiers from the Reheboth Baster people, who were descended from Cape Boers and Khoikhoi peoples and classified as "natives" under German colonial law (see also fig. 38 ). Witbooi and Rehebother soldiers fought alongside Germans in the 1904 war against the Ovaherero. In figure 16 the colonial power structure has not disappeared, but its visual constellation has been altered, making this an image of fear and humiliation. The gaze of photographer and colonizer have merged. The Ovaherero are not �ust starving in this photograph; they are also surrendering. Compelling arguments have been made against reproducing comparable images from the Holocaust. The risks of overfamiliarity and reproducing the gaze of the photographer-perpetrator seem partially offset in this case by the fact that these events and images are still relatively unfamiliar to the descendents of the perpetrators and others outside Namibia. 38 Ovaherero who were captured or who surrendered after the extermination order was lifted in December 1904 were executed or sent to concentration camps, where the ma�ority perished. Shark Island, located off the coast at Lüderitzbucht, held both Nama and Ovaherero prisoners and was one of the most notorious concentration camps during the 1904 -8 war, with a mortality rate above 90 percent (1904 -1908) German rule in Namibia ended in 1915, when South African troops occupied the territory. In 1920 the League of Nations officially transferred control of the colony to Great Britain, which subcontracted the �ob to its South African colony. Unlike the other former German colonies, Southwest Africa retained a sizable German-speaking settler population and continued to attract new German immigrants during the interwar period and especially after 1945. Today there are as many as twenty thousand German speakers in Namibia, including the current (as of July 2005) Namibian ambassador to Germany, whose grandparents emigrated to the colony during the 1920s. 40 In the 1920s the Ovaherero began to reconstitute their shattered society and cattle herds and to reclaim ancestral lands. 41 Survivors of the 1904 genocide converted in great numbers to Christianity in the German POW camps between 1904 and 1908 after resisting missionary blandishments for more than a half century. Similarly, the Oturupa, or "troop players" movement, initially involved an adoption of part of the enemy's symbolic system. The practices of conversion and Otu rupa were generated out of the post-1904 context of defeat and identification with the aggressor, although both eventually became sites of mutual aid and resistance to the South African regime. The Oturupa initially took on a degraded version of German culture, but they also reworked the visual archive of German colonialism. 42 In the years after World War I, Ovaherero men began to wear odd bits of German military uniforms. (See figs. 21-22.) Oturupa members conducted German-style drills using sticks for rifles. The Oturupa was organized into regimental districts in which ranking individuals took the names of former German officers and passed notes to one another written in German. In the 1920s Oturupa members sometimes carried flags with the black, white, and red colors of the imperial German flag. 43 42. The timing of the sudden wave of Ovaherero conversion immediately after the war underscores the context of social crisis in which these cultural transformations took place. The Ovaherero did not adopt the clothing or other signifiers of their Khoikhoi enemies before or after their "liberation" from the Khoikhoi leader Jonker Afrikaner in the nineteenth century. The fact that the Ovaherero adopted the signifiers of the Germans but not of the Khoikhoi, and that they did so en masse only after the defeat and genocide of 1904, is of crucial importance. 
Figure 18
Concentration Camp, Shark Island, ca. 1906 -7. Courtesy National Archives of Namibia propriation of ancestral Ovaherero space and an ongoing consolidation of a shattered nation; on the other hand, they continue to reveal the legacies of German colonialism and genocide. For example, one aspect of the annual Red Flag Day events is the gathering around the traditional ancestors' fire and the recitation of praise songs and ombimbi, which, in precolonial times, were sung when warriors and hunters returned home; today the songs often refer to the 1904 war. 46 In the background of figure 28 is a cameraman from the Namibian Broadcasting Corporation, indicating one of the ways in which independent Namibia is reclaiming the visual representation of itself.
Another visible indicator of change is the construction (since the mid-nineteenth century) of Ovaherero graves in European Christian style (figure 30). A traditional Ovaherero grave, like the one in figure 29, indicated the status of the deceased with the number of cattle skulls displayed on it (some contemporary Ovaherero graves combine a European-style headstone with a cattle skull). Ovaherero traditionally believe that ancestors have more power than the living, and that one should never engage in struggles over a grave, much less desecrate one. Indeed, this may be an additional reason for the failure to remove or alter the offensive 46. Jekura Kavari, Dag Henrichssen, and Larissa Förster, "Die Jekura Kavari, Dag Henrichssen, and Larissa Förster, "Die oturupa," in Föster, Henrichsen, and Bollig, NamibiaDeutschland, 162. German colonial monuments in Namibia (like the ones in figures 33, 35, 37, and 39, below), some of which are allegedly understood as German graves. 47 Each year on the annual memorial days, the Ovaherero visit the Okahan�da and Waterberg cemeteries and honor the graves not only of their own people, but also of their erstwhile enemies, the fallen soldiers of the Schutztruppe, or German colonial army. Figure 31 shows Ovaherero behind the old Rhenish mission church at Okahand�a visiting the grave of Richard Max von Rosenberg, a lieutenant in the Imperial Colonial Army who was wounded in action on April 9, 1904, and died on April 25. According to the inscription, he "fought the good fight."
Germany and the Memory of Nazism and Southwest Africa
German-Namibian relations have slowly intensified since the 1980s. 48 SWAPO's victory in the first free Namibian elections in 1989 was greeted by a Bundestag resolution welcoming Namibia's independence and recognizing Germany's "special relationship" to the country, which made it a focal point for bilateral German development aid. 49 In a speech in 2004, the German ambassador to Namibia stressed that "the German government lives up to its historical responsibility by establishing a special relationship with independent Namibia," adding that "since 1990 Namibia has been receiving more than five hundred million euros for its own development" -more aid per capita than Germany gave to any other country. 50 The "special importance" of the relationship between Namibia and Germany "is also reflected in high-ranking reciprocal visits." Movement toward a more direct acknowledgment of past atrocities began in the late 1990s when a governing coalition of Social Democrats and Greens came to power in Germany. In August 2004 the German Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development, Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, addressed Ovaherero leaders during the commemoration of the battle of Ohamakari and acknowledged "the violence inflicted by the German colonial powers on your ancestors, particularly the Herero and the Nama" and "the atrocities committed." She recognized that "following the uprisings, the surviving Herero, Nama, and Damara were interned in camps and put to forced labor of such brutality that many did not survive." And in a carefully worded conclusion, Wieczorek-Zeul admitted that "the atrocities committed at that time would today be termed genocide." 51 In May 2005 the German government created a special reconciliation fund of ₡20 million (separate from its annual aid budget for Namibia of ₡12 million) to pursue specific development pro�ects among the Ovaherero, Damara, and Nama peoples -the groups most grievously affected by the German policies of 1904 -8. In Namibia, the SWAPO government began recently trying to return some of the previously expropriated commercial farmland to indigenous Namibians In Berlin in November of 2004, at a panel discussion of the genocide, a member of the von Trotha family apologized publicly for the deeds of his distant relative. 53 Around the same time, representatives of the von Trotha family met with two descendants of Samuel Maherero and issued a written statement indicating that "we, members of the 'von Trotha' family, are ashamed of the terrible events that took place a hundred years ago," and that "we share . . . what has been expressed by our Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development . . . concerning the historic guilt of Germans during their colonial rule in Namibia." 54 Namibia is thus a distinctive case in many ways for Germany, as Germany is for Namibia. For many the theme of colonial genocide appears to connect Namibia to Nazism. 55 An influentual older history of German Southwest Africa by historian Helmut Bley concludes with a section entitled "Growing Totalitarianism," which discusses Hannah Arendt's argument about the continuity between imperialism and totalitarianism (despite the fact that Arendt focused on the South African Boers rather than the colonial Germans). 56 After all, Southwest Africa's first German governor, Heinrich Goering, was the father of the Nazi Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering. The ma�ority of German Namibians were enthusiastic Nazis during the 1930s and 1940s, and even in modern independent Namibia there remain neo-Nazis and right-wing extremists. 57 The neo-Arendtian argument deriving Nazism from colonialism has been followed up by more recent research on the Nazi Generalgouvernement in occupied Poland and the Final Solution. 58 Tied together by these events of a century ago, the two countries have dealt with them in different ways. The colonial monuments in the capital that celebrate the country's erstwhile German colonizers are one of the more remarkable sights for a newcomer to Namibia. Southwest Africa was unique both because before World War I it already had more colonial monuments than any of the other German colonies and because none of these monuments were removed by the South African or postcolonial governments; in the other former German colonies the comparable monuments were removed by the new colonizers after World War I. Yet these monuments are unambiguously intended to demonstrate German political-military superiority and dominance. Churches too were "signs of spiritual and cultural dominance" where missionaries' condemnation of indigenous beliefs was backed by the power of the colonial state. 59 The Christ Church in Windhoek combines the political-military and the spiritual-cultural modes of domination. It is located on a hill above the main street in downtown Windhoek, ad�acent to an even more powerful symbol of colonial political-military authority, the German fortress called Alte Feste, built in 1889 by Curt von François, the colony's second Imperial Commissary from March 1891 to March 1894. 60 In front of the fortress stands the most aggressive colonial symbol in all of Namibia, the bronze equestrian Windhoek's Christ Church, consecrated in 1910, was built to commemorate the Germans who died in the Ovaherero and Nama wars (see fig. 32 ). An entire wall of the church is filled with a plaque listing the names of every German and European killed in the Namibian colonial wars. Although this cluster of ob�ects might seem to confirm the thesis of a failed decolonization of the urban landscape, more recent cultural interventions partially discount this theory. Like all colonizing powers, the Germans staked out their claim to rule in Namibia by creating a dense symbolic landscape, erecting a large number of monuments and replacing indigenous names with the names of their own leaders. 62 The post-independence Namibian government also changed many street and place names; Leutweinstraße (Leutwein Street) in front of the Alte Feste became Robert Mugabe Avenue and the street leading up to the Christuskirche is now named for Fidel Castro (see figure 32) . 63 The government stopped illuminating the equestrian statue at night, and a group of German and Namibian artists painted a mural nearby of the destruction of the statue of the horse and rider and their replacement on the pedestal by a white rabbit, which seems to represent a peaceful (and anxious) alternative to imperial militarism. 64 The display inside the old fortress, which now houses part of the Namibian National Museum, deals with the country's anticolonial and antiapartheid movements and the creation of postcolonial democracy. Statues of anticolonial leaders have been commissioned and installed in the Namibian Parliament Gardens, and historical sites that are not cel- First, German monuments are strewn all over the world, from Qingdao to Equatorial Guinea, a fact that is overlooked in some of the research on German monuments. Second, within Germany, Bremen and Hamburg (rather than Berlin) are the central memorial sites for colonialism (see n. 16).
63. It is worth noting here that Namibia is widely considered to be one of the most democratic countries in Africa.
64. The rabbit is associated in German with anxiety, as in the expression Angsthase (literally "frightened rabbit," meaning "scaredy-cat"). For an image of the mural see the Web site "Mural Global" by the German artist group Farbfieber at www.mural-global.org/dir2A_doc58B.html (accessed July 14, 2005). Figure 40 shows one display in the museum inside the Alte Feste containing images of heroes and martyrs of the armed struggle against South African apartheid rule: a camouflage uniform made in the USSR and used by SWAPO and PLAN (its military wing -People's Liberation Army of Namibia), and Soviet-made rifles used by the first SWAPO combatants. There are also busts of Samuel Maherero and Hendrik Witbooi. Figure 41 shows a poster announcing the film Nujoma: Where Others Wavered about the life of Sam Nu�oma, the first president of a newly independent Namibia and the leader of SWAPO resistance against the South African regime. 67 The film is being directed by African-American filmmaker Charles Burnett and stars Danny Glover and Carl Lumbly. It is financed by the Namibian government and is scheduled for completion in December 2005. The filmmakers called on locals to participate as extras and transformed the streets of Swakopmund and other towns into stage sets.
Globalization of Public Memory
Although direct memory of German colonialism was weak in Germany from the 1920s through the 1980s, there was extensive indirect participation in colonial consciousness through the circulation of degrading images of African, Asian, Amerindian, and Oceanic people. But a weakly articulated discourse about colonial atrocities and imperialism's horrific legacy, based on the thesis codified by Hannah Arendt, was always present. Today we see the Arendtian thesis becoming a leading model for Germany's construction of its colonial past. Paralleling this is intensified public criticism of the ways Africans have long been depicted in Germany. The discussion of Namibia is partly responsible for this changing optic, due to the putative links between German colonialism there and the Holocaust.
The situation within Namibia is not separate from these reconfigurations of collective colonial memory and its visual archive in Germany. Some Ovaherero are comparing their community's history to the Holocaust. Although this German axis is �ust one factor shaping public memory in Namibia, it is an important one because of the local prominence of monuments from the German era and the Ovaherero reparations claims. Theorists have long insisted that postcolonialism is a global condition, not one that is located solely in the "Third World." The case of Namibia and Germany shows that the decolonization of public memory does not proceed separately but is also a relationship between (former) metropoles and postcolonies.
